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We consider organizations with a single principal and many agents who
interact in an environment with the following features: (a) Nature im-
perfectly informs the principal via a state-contingent signal, but not
the agents, about the state of the world, (b) the principal selectively
shares this information with the agents, thereby endogenously endow-
ing them with private information that is coarser than his own, (c) the
principal assigns action spaces to the agents, and (d) an agent’s control
over the choice from his assigned action space is inalienable. Designing
an organization involves specifying (c) and specifying an information
dissemination system for implementing (b). Searching for an optimal
design involves (1) deriving optimal performance from each design, and
(2) comparing designs on the basis of their best performances. Our ex-
istence results show the feasibility of performing Step (1) in a large class
of cases.
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1.1 Motivation
The formal study of organizations involves two signiﬁcant classes of complications:
(a) structural complexity, and (b) complexities stemming from asymmetries of information
and incentives. (a) refers to the myriad ways of assigning rights and responsibilities, and
structuring relationships of power and authority, among the members of the organization,
e.g., a given member might serve as a common principal (resp. agent) for various agents
(resp. principals) or may perform multiple roles by acting as a principal in one relationship
and an agent in another. (b) refers to the problems of inducing members to make decisions
in the organization’s interest when they possess private information or their decisions
cannot be monitored eﬀectively and contracted upon. Depending on the context, these
complications may be treated as descriptors of the environment, i.e., as primitives of a
model, or as aspects of the organization design chosen in response to the environment, i.e.,
as constructions chosen by a rational decision-maker. An objective of the economic theory
of organizations1 is to solve the design problem: given an environment, a class of feasible
designs, and an evaluation criterion, ﬁnd an optimal organization design.2
In order to solve the design problem for a given environment, the ﬁrst step is to use
the given criterion to evaluate the feasible organization designs in terms of the outcomes
that follow from them. In this paper, we model this problem and show that it can be solved
in the following framework. The environment that we consider has the following salient
features: (a) Nature initially endows only one member of the organization with private
information, and (b) the informed member is the sole principal and the other members
are his agents. Feature (b) will be formally represented by identifying the organization’s
evaluation criterion with the principal’s payoﬀ function. The class of organization designs
considered in response to this environment is restricted by the following features: (a) the
division of labor in the organization is such that the principal designs the organization and
coordinates activities, while the agents are delegated the various tasks that constitute the
organization’s activities and determine the payoﬀ-relevant outcomes, and (b) the principal
uses two channels to communicate with the agents, one private and the other public.
With respect to (a), an agent’s performance of assigned tasks is to be guided solely by
his incentives. With respect to (b), the private channel is used to share, privately and
selectively, portions of the principal’s information with the agents, thereby endowing them
1with private information that is coarser than the principal’s. The public channel is used
to publicly recommend action choices to the agents.
Thus, we consider organizations that operate sequentially as follows: (1) Nature in-
forms the principal, but not the agents, about the state of the world, (2) the principal
selectively and privately shares this information with the agents, and (3) an agent chooses
an action after hearing the publicly issued action recommendation by the principal. Every
member’s payoﬀ will depend on the state and the proﬁle of actions chosen by the agents.
When deciding whether to obey the principal, an agent’s belief regarding the state will
be conditioned on the private signal received in Step (2) and the public recommendation
received in Step (3). Our notion of equilibrium will require the principal to issue recom-
mendations that every agent will choose to obey, assuming that the other agents will do
so too.
The principal’s role in the postulated organization is twofold: (®) to design the organi-
zation, and (¯) to use this design and his information to guide the agents’ decision-making.
Role (®) is performed before seeing Nature’s state-contingent signal, i.e., prior to Step (1)
in the scheme described above. It involves specifying the agents’ action spaces and the or-
ganization’s communication system. Role (¯) involves recommending actions to the agents
in the context of the chosen organization design. The action spaces serve as the language
in which the principal issues recommendations to the agents and as the sets from which
the agents choose their responses in Step (3). The organization’s communication system
determines the extent of information sharing by the principal in Step (2). The action
recommendations in Step (3) are an indirect source of information for the agents as they
may reveal information about the state in addition to what is shared directly with them
in Step (2).
An agent’s role in the organization is to choose an action from the action space as-
signed to him by the design after receiving his share of the principal’s information and
the principal’s action recommendation. The principal uses his privileged position in the
organization to manipulate the agents’ incentives, via the design and the recommended
actions, in order to induce action choices that are optimal from his point of view subject
to the constraint that the action chosen by each agent must be incentive compatible for
him given the constraints imposed by the organization design.
The objective of this paper is to model Role (¯) and show that the principal can
perform this role optimally. More precisely, given an organization design, we show the ex-
istence of a mapping that generates state-contingent action recommendations to the agents
2with the following properties. First, it respects the principal’s information constraint via
an appropriate measurability requirement. Secondly, it induces obedience by all the agents
in every state. Thirdly, among all mappings possessing the above two properties, the given
mapping is optimal from the principal’s point of view. This exercise enables the principal
to evaluate a particular organization design prior to receiving his private information, thus
deﬁning a value function over the set of organization designs. We show that this ex ante
evaluation program can be carried out in two distinct environments; see the hypotheses of
Theorems 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
Given the value function generated by a solution of Role (¯), the choice of a design in
Role (®) is now a matter of maximizing the derived value function over the set of feasible
designs. In order to get quickly to the formal results, we relegate our observations regarding
Role (®) to Section 3. However, a reader wishing to contextualize the above discussion
of organizations may make a detour to Section 3.2 where we describe the problem of
“designing a ﬁrm” as an example of the general problem of designing an organization.
1.2 The literature
The organization described above resonates with the notions of teams described in [20]
and syndicates described in [31]; in particular, it has a number of congruencies with the
generalized team described in Part Two of [20]. For instance, unlike a classical team, but
like a generalized team, our organization will allow for heterogeneous preferences. Apart
from these seminal sources, our work is related to the vast literature on principal-agent
problems with a single principal.
The literature on organizations has considered various selections from the above-
mentioned complexities to describe the “environment” and a variety of classes of orga-
nization “designs”. With respect to structural complexity, while multiple role-playing is
not modelled generally and models with a single agent facing multiple principals are of
relatively recent vintage (e.g., [5] and [9]), the bulk of the literature concerns simple or-
ganizations consisting of a single principal facing one or more agents. With respect to
complications arising from informational asymmetries, while some models endow the prin-
cipal with private information (e.g., [21], [22] and [25]), most models allow only the agents
to have private information.
We start with the principal-agent literature that does not allow the principal to have
private information. The models in this literature feature a selection from the following
3sequence of events: (a) Nature privately conveys to each agent his type, (b) agents pri-
vately report their types, possibly falsely, to the principal, (c) the principal sends privacy-
preserving action recommendations to the agents based on the received type reports, and
(d) each agent chooses an action based on his type and the action recommendation received
from the principal. Note that (b) and (c) feature communication that is modelled using the
“direct” message spaces. The principal’s problem is to choose privacy-preserving action
recommendations, conditional on the type-reports, that maximize his expected payoﬀ.
This problem is simpliﬁed further by restricting the principal’s attention to reports-to-
recommendations mappings that, in a non-cooperative fashion, induce truthful reporting
of types and obedient choice of actions by the agents.3
This class of models can be further divided into three sub-classes. First, there are the
pure “hidden characteristic” models, i.e., models that suppress steps (c) and (d) of the
general model described above and replace them with an outcome function that directly
maps agents’ type reports to outcomes; we refer the reader to Chapter 7 of [13] for an
introduction to this voluminous literature. In eﬀect, each agent has ﬁner exogenously
speciﬁed information than the principal and an agent’s control over his action choice (if
any) is alienated. Secondly, there are the pure “hidden action” models, i.e., models that
suppress steps (a) and (b) of the general model described above; examples include [14], [16],
[19], [23] and [29]. In eﬀect, neither the principal nor the agents have exogenously speciﬁed
private information. Thirdly, there are models that allow agents to have exogenously
speciﬁed private information and retain control over their actions; for instance, see [18].
The model we study diﬀers from this entire literature in two essential and obvious
ways. First, in our model, the principal has private information that he distributes among
the agents. Therefore, each agent’s information regarding the state is coarser than that
of the principal, rather than the other way around. Secondly, in our model, the principal
communicates publicly with the agents rather than privately. Moreover, our model departs
from the pure hidden characteristic models in that it does not alienate an agent’s control
over his action choice. It also departs from the pure hidden action models in that it features
informational asymmetries in addition to those related to the observability of endogenously
generated action choices by the agents.
We now turn to the second strand of the literature on principal-agent models, i.e.,
models in which the principal has private information, as in our model. This literature
includes [25] in a largely cooperative game setting and [21] and [22] in the non-cooperative
game setting. The motivation for this literature can be illustrated by the dilemma faced by
4the seller of a used car (the principal) after learning the quality of the car (the principal’s
private information): if it is common knowledge that he may oﬀer a warranty to the buyer,
then his (non-)oﬀer of a warranty itself conveys information to a potential buyer regarding
the quality of the car. More generally, the contract oﬀered by an informed principal may
leak his private information. The papers cited above study the resulting problem: what is
the optimal way for the principal to structure the contract when the contract may reveal
some of his private information? As the common values version of the problem studied in
[22] has more in common with our setting, all further discussion will cite only this paper
as Maskin-Tirole.
The Maskin-Tirole model is as follows. Consider a principal contracting with a single
agent. The principal has private information while the agent does not. The model has
three stages after the principal learns his type. First, the principal oﬀers a contract to the
agent. Next, the agent either rejects that contract, thereby ending the game, or accepts
it, thereby sending the play of the game to the third stage; this is the only decision made
by the agent in this model. If the oﬀered contract is accepted in the second stage, then it
is implemented in the third stage. A contract maps the principal’s type to the outcome
space.4 The principal’s ability to oﬀer any such mapping as a contract reﬂects the fact
that the agent does not control any outcome-relevant action choice when the contract is
implemented; otherwise, the class of contracts from which the principal makes a choice
would be limited to those that induce appropriate action choices by the agent.
The model studied in this paper may be seen as an enrichment of the third stage of
the Maskin-Tirole model in the following dimensions. First, we introduce action choice
by the agent as an ingredient of the implementation stage. The implied moral hazard
problem restricts the set of implementable contracts that the principal can oﬀer in the
ﬁrst stage of the Maskin-Tirole model. This restriction is in the nature of a reﬁnement
and the implications of this reﬁnement for the full three-stage Maskin-Tirole results are
unclear. Secondly, we allow multiple agents in our model. This is a non-trivial complica-
tion as these agents have heterogeneous preferences and information, and control action
choices. Thirdly, we allow direct information revelation by the principal instead of the
indirect way postulated in the Maskin-Tirole model. As the principal controls the process
of information revelation, the agents are endowed with private information, albeit coarser
than the principal’s information.
Returning to the example of the car salesman, the seller may reveal information to
potential buyers not just indirectly via the (non-)oﬀer of a warranty, but also directly, say
5via the selective sharing of maintenance records or technical information certiﬁed by an
“honest broker”. More generally, we have the question that characterizes the principal’s
Role (®): how should the principal use his ability to structure the information dissemi-
nation and action allocation in an organization? Obviously, the same question arises in
signalling models (e.g., [7]), especially if there are multiple signal receivers.
1.3 The model
We begin the modelling of the principal’s problem with respect to Role (¯) by describ-
ing the data that is exogenously given. (Ω;F) is a measurable state space. (T;T ) is the
measurable space of signals received by the principal from Nature. P 2 ∆(Ω) is the princi-
pal’s prior belief about the state; henceforth, ∆(Y ) will denote the set of probability mea-
sures on a measurable set Y . The principal’s information about the state is derived from
the signal generated by the surjective measurable function s : Ω ! T. Λ : T £ F ! [0;1]
is the transition kernel generating the principal’s belief about the state conditional on the
signal received from Nature. Interpreting Λ as a regular conditional distribution on (Ω;F)
imposes the following restrictions on it: (a) for every t 2 T, Λ(t;:) 2 ∆(Ω), (b) for every
E 2 F, Λ(:;E) is measurable, (c) P(:) =
R
T P ± s¡1(dt)Λ(t;:), and (d) Λ(t;s¡1(ftg)) = 1
for P ± s¡1 almost every t 2 T.5 (O;O) is the measurable outcome space. w : O ! < is
the principal’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, representing his preference º deﬁned on
∆(O). I is the set of agents. vi : O ! < is agent i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function, representing agent i’s preference ºi on ∆(O).
Now consider an organization design d = f((Ti;Ti);si;(Ai;Ai));¾ j i 2 Ig; the prob-
lem of choosing an optimal design d deﬁnes the principal’s Role (®), which we consider in
Section 3. (Ti;Ti) is the measurable space of signals received by agent i from the princi-
pal. si : T ! Ti is the surjective measurable mapping that generates agent i’s signal as
a function of the principal’s information. The collection f(Ti;Ti);si j i 2 Ig is the prin-
cipal’s information dissemination system. (Ai;Ai) is agent i’s measurable action space.
A =
Q
i2I Ai is the set of action proﬁles and ¾ : Ω £ A ! O is the measurable outcome
function. Combining design d with the exogenously given data, we have the data
Γ = f(Ω;F);(T;T );(P;s;Λ);(O;O);w;I;(vi;(Ti;Ti);si;(Ai;Ai))i2I;¾;¸g (1:3:1)
where ¸ 2 ∆(Ω £ A) is the agents’ common prior belief about the state and the action
proﬁle to be recommended by the principal.
6Agent i’s information is generated by the mapping Fi : Ω £ A ! Ti £ A, where
Fi(!;a) = (si±s(!);a). Fi has distribution ¸±F
¡1
i on Ti£A. Let Λi : Ti£A£F ! [0;1]
generate agent i’s posterior belief about the state conditional on receiving the message
generated by Fi. This requires that (a) Λi(ti;a;:) 2 ∆(Ω) for every (ti;a) 2 Ti £ A,
(b) Λi(:;:;E) is measurable for every E 2 F, and (c) ¸(: £ A) =
R
Ti£A ¸ ± F
¡1
i (dti £
da)Λi(ti;a;:). Of the message Fi(!;a) received by agent i, the ﬁrst component si ± s(!)
is private, while the second component a is public, with the interpretation that ai is the




Λi(si(t);a;d!)vi ± ¾(!;b) (1:3:2)
ui(t;a;b) is agent i’s expected utility if the principal receives the signal t 2 T (whereupon
agent i receives the private signal si(t)), publicly recommends the action proﬁle a 2 A and
the chosen action proﬁle is b 2 A. Note that agent i’s expected utility does not depend
directly on t, but only indirectly via agent i’s signal si(t).
Deﬁne Bi : T £ A ) Ai by Bi(t;a) = \c2Aifb 2 Ai j ui(t;a;a¡i;b) ¸ ui(t;a;a¡i;c)g,
which is the set of optimal action choices by agent i if the principal receives signal t,
recommends the action proﬁle a 2 A, and the other agents choose actions as per the
principal’s recommendation. Deﬁne B : T £A ) A by B(t;a) =
Q
i2I Bi(t;a). Also deﬁne




Λ(t;d!)w ± ¾(!;a) (1:3:3)
which is the principal’s expected utility conditional on receiving signal t 2 T from Nature
and action proﬁle a 2 A being implemented by the agents.
Deﬁnition 1.3.4. (A) a : T ! A is an equilibrium coordination plan (ECP) for Γ if
(a) a is measurable, and
(b) a(t) 2 B(t;a(t)) for every t 2 T.
Let E be the set of ECPs for Γ.
(B) An ex ante optimal ECP for Γ is a 2 E such that
R
Ω P(d!)w ± ¾(!;a ± s(!)) ¸
R
Ω P(d!)w ± ¾(!;b ± s(!)) for every b 2 E.
(C) An ex post optimal ECP for Γ is a 2 E such that W(t;a(t)) ¸ W(t;b(t)) for every
t 2 T and every b 2 E.
In the deﬁnition of an ECP, (a) ensures that the coordination plan respects the prin-
cipal’s information constraint, while (b) ensures that, for every signal t received by the
7principal, his action recommendations a(t) induce obedience by all the agents. An ex ante
optimal ECP yields the principal the highest expected payoﬀ among all ECPs before re-
ceiving Nature’s signal. However, there is no guarantee that the principal would choose
to implement an ex ante optimal ECP after receiving Nature’s signal; an ex post optimal
ECP guarantees this. The following result provides the natural link between ex ante and
ex post optimal ECPs.
Lemma 1.3.5. Consider Γ. If w ± ¾ is integrable and a 2 E is an ex post optimal ECP,
then a is an ex ante optimal ECP.
Given this fact, we will search for ex post optimal ECPs and henceforth drop the
qualiﬁer “ex post”. Our method of showing the existence of an optimal ECP is as follows.
First, we characterize an ECP as a measurable selection from an appropriate equilibrium
mapping from T to A (Lemmas 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.4). Next, we compose the equilibrium
mapping with W to derive a mapping from T to <; for each t 2 T, this mapping yields
the set of payoﬀs for the principal resulting from the set of ECPs. Finally, an implicit
measurable selection theorem is used to extract an ECP from the equilibrium mapping
that, for every t 2 T, yields the highest possible payoﬀ to the principal among all the
ECPs.
Some interpretative remarks regarding Γ are appropriate at this stage.
First, assuming a common belief ¸ across agents is a matter of convenience and is
not required for our results. Moreover, although we have taken ¸ as primitive data in
the interest of descriptive economy, it may itself be derived from other speciﬁcations of
primitive data. For instance, suppose M is a set of mappings a : T ! A that may generate
the principal’s action recommendations contingent on his information. Let Q 2 ∆(Ω£M)
be the agents’ belief regarding the state and the mapping to be used by the principal to
generate recommendations. Deﬁne » : Ω £ M ! Ω £ A by »(!;a) = (!;a ± s(!)). Given
this formalism, we may set ¸ = Q ± »¡1. In particular, if the agents share the principal’s
belief P regarding the state and believe that the mapping a 2 M is used to generate the
action recommendations, then Q = P £ ±a and ¸ = (P £ ±a) ± »¡1.
Secondly, while the principal needs to know all the data in Γ in order to formulate
his decision problem and ﬁnd an optimal ECP, the agents do not necessarily need to know
all of Γ in order to formulate their decision problems as per our equilibrium concept. For
instance, the agents do not need to know w and (P;Λ). Moreover, agent i need not know
(vj;(Tj;Tj);sj) for j 2 I ¡ fig.
8Thirdly, while the deﬁnition of an ECP does not explicitly feature participation con-
straints for the agents, the provision of appropriate action spaces and outcome functions
implicitly allows such constraints to be incorporated. For instance, an agent’s “partici-
pation decision” can be captured implicitly in our framework by allowing him an action
corresponding to “zero eﬀort” and rigging the outcome function so that the resulting out-
come is no worse than an agent’s “reservation outcome”. Naturally, such requirements will
place restrictions on the class of feasible organization designs.
1.4 An application
Consider a ﬁrm with a single owner and a set of workers I. Let O = O0 £
Q
i2I Oi
be the outcome space, with Oi as worker i’s private outcome space (e.g., the space of
i’s wages) and O0 as the supplementary outcome space (e.g., the space of the owner’s
revenues). Worker i’s utility is generated by v¤
i : Oi ! <, i.e., vi = v¤
i ± ¼i, where ¼i
projects O on Oi. The other aspects of the environment are as described in Section 1.3.
We may interpret a state ! 2 Ω as representing technology and s(!) 2 T as the owner’s
information regarding the state.
The ﬁrm’s design is described as follows. The action spaces fAi j i 2 Ig and the
mappings si are as described in Section 1.3. We set Ti ½ OA
i , i.e., the information shared
by worker i with the owner is a mapping ti : A ! Oi, which we interpret to be a contract
that generates worker i’s private outcome as a function of the action proﬁle; worker i’s
wage may depend not only on his own eﬀort but also on i’s eﬀort relative to the eﬀorts
of other workers, as in a tournament set-up studied in [19]. So, if the state is !, then the
owner will receive signal s(!) and award contract si ±s(!) to worker i. Finally, deﬁne the
outcome function ¾ : Ω £ A ! O by
¾(!;a) = ¾0(!;a) £ (si ± s(!)(a))i2I
Using the above deﬁnitions of v¤
i and ¾ and the regularity of Λi, if t is the signal received
by the owner, a is the proﬁle of actions recommended by the owner and b is the proﬁle of














9The nature of preferences and the outcome function imply that the only aspect of state
! that is relevant to worker i is the contract si ± s(!) awarded to him. Consequently, the
regularity of Λi implies that si±s(!) = si(t) almost surely, which enables the simpliﬁcation
evident in (1.4.1). In the general model, the privateness of each agent’s signal is a means
for manipulating agents’ incentives via their posterior beliefs regarding the state. As is
clear from (1.4.1), the privateness of signal si(t) is irrelevant in this application. Given
this set-up and design, does the owner have an optimal ECP? We show in Section 2.5
that the nature of si(t) is crucial for guaranteeing an aﬃrmative answer as it directly and
exclusively determines the dependence of i’s private outcome and payoﬀ on the proﬁle of
actions. More precisely, we provide two classes of contracts that allow the existence of an
optimal ECP.
To summarize, the application involves the specialization of some of the data describ-
ing Γ, namely, the outcome space O, the agents’ payoﬀ functions vi, the agents’ signal
spaces Ti and the outcome function ¾. This specialized version of Γ will be denoted by
Γ¤. In Section 2.5, we provide assumptions regarding Γ¤ that enable the application of the
general results regarding Γ.
1.5 Plan of paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the
statements and proofs of various results concerning the existence of optimal ECPs. In
Section 2.1, we state various mathematical conventions that we employ in this paper.
Section 2.2 is devoted to deriving the properties of the expected utility functions ui and
W, deﬁned by (1.3.2) and (1.3.3) respectively, under a variety of assumptions regarding
the primitive data Γ. Although these properties play a vital role in the existence results
related to ECPs (resp. optimal ECPs) of Section 2.3 (resp. Section 2.4), they may be taken
as given if the reader wishes to pass directly to Section 2.3. In Section 2.5, we apply the
results of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 to the application described in Section 1.4. We consider the
problem of choosing an optimal organization design in Section 3 and conclude in Section
4. The proofs are relegated to the two appendices.
2. Solutions of existence problem
2.1 Conventions
We shall use the following conventions without speciﬁc comment: (1) a measurable
space refers to a pair (X;X), where X is a set and X is a ¾-algebra on X; (2) subsets
10of measurable (resp. topological) spaces are given the trace ¾-algebra (resp. subspace
topology); (3) products of measurable (resp. topological) spaces are given the product
¾-algebra (resp. topology); (4) if X is a topological space, then it is given the Borel
¾-algebra, denoted by B(X); (5) the set of real numbers, <, is given the Euclidean metric
topology; (6) if X and Y are topological spaces, then the space of continuous functions
f : X ! Y is denoted by Y X; (7) if X is topological, then the space of bounded elements of
<X is denoted by C(X); (8) if (X;X) and (Y;Y) are measurable spaces, then the product
measurable space is denoted by (X £ Y;X £ Y). Lemma B.1 implies that conventions (2)
and (4) are consistent. Lemma B.2 implies that conventions (3) and (4) are consistent for
a wide class of situations relevant to this paper. Given a measurable space (X;X) and
topological spaces Y and Z, a function f : X £Y ! Z is said to be Caratheodory if f(:;y)
is measurable for every y 2 Y and f(x;:) is continuous for every x 2 X; by convention,
whenever we describe a function as being “Caratheodory”, we mean that it is measurable
in the ﬁrst argument and continuous in the second argument. We shall abbreviate “locally
convex topological vector space” to l.c.s.
F : X ) Y denotes a set-valued mapping with domain X and values in 2Y . Given
topological spaces X and Y , F is said to be upper (resp. lower) hemicontinuous if F+(E) =
fx 2 X j F(x) ½ Eg (resp. F¡(E) = fx 2 X j F(x) \ E 6= ;g) is open in X for every E
open in Y . If (X;X) is a measurable space and Y is a topological space, then F is said to
be measurable (resp. weakly measurable) if F¡(E) 2 X for every E closed (resp. open) in
Y . We note some well-known facts that we shall use repeatedly without explicit reference.
Remark 2.1.1. A compact metric space is second countable ([10], Theorem XI.4.1), sep-
arable ([10], Theorem VIII.7.3) and complete ([10], Corollary XIV.2.4); consequently, it is
a Polish space, and therefore a Souslin space (see [15]). Given convention (2), a product
of compact spaces is compact ([10], Theorem XI.1.4); a countable product of metrizable
spaces is metrizable ([10], Corollary IX.7.3).
2.2 Properties of the expected utility function
In this section we establish conditions on Γ that ensure ui and W are either continuous
or Caratheodory. We prove the results related to ui but omit the proofs of results related
to W as they are analogous.
The properties of ui, deﬁned by (1.3.2), are ingredients in the existence theorems
proved in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Lemma 2.2.1 speciﬁes assumptions on Γ guaranteeing that
11ui is continuous. Lemmas 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, and Corollary 2.2.4, provide conditions guaran-
teeing that ui is Caratheodory, i.e., ui(:;a;b) is measurable and ui(t;:;:) is continuous.
The common features of all three lemmas are: A and O are topological spaces and
vi is continuous. The state space Ω is given topological structure in Lemmas 2.2.1 and
2.2.2, so that F = B(Ω), but not in Lemma 2.2.3. The outcome function ¾ is assumed
to be continuous in Lemmas 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, but this requirement is weakened in Lemma
2.2.3. Finally, for E 2 F, while Λi(:;:;E) is assumed to be continuous in Lemma 2.2.1, it
is required to be only a Caratheodory mapping in Lemmas 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
Lemma 2.2.1. Consider Γ and i 2 I. If
(a) Ω is compact metric; A, O, T and Ti are topological,
(b) ¾, vi and si are continuous, and
(c) Λi : Ti £A£B(Ω) ! [0;1] is such that Λi(ti;a;:) 2 ∆(Ω) for every (ti;a) 2 Ti £A
and Λi(:;:;E) is continuous for every E 2 B(Ω),
then ui is continuous.
The next two results provide conditions that ensure ui is a Caratheodory mapping,
as required in Theorem 2.3.5.
Lemma 2.2.2. Consider Γ and i 2 I. If
(a) Ω is compact metric; A and O are topological,
(b) ¾ and vi are continuous, and
(c) Λi : Ti £A£B(Ω) ! [0;1] is such that Λi(ti;a;:) 2 ∆(Ω) for every (ti;a) 2 Ti £A
and Λi(:;:;E) is Caratheodory for every E 2 B(Ω),
then ui is Caratheodory.
The next result weakens the continuity assumption on ¾ to a property intermedi-
ate between continuity and the Caratheodory property. Denote by B(Ω;F) the space of
functions that are uniform limits of ﬁnite linear combinations of functions drawn from
f1E j E 2 Fg; equip B(Ω;F) with the supremum norm.
Lemma 2.2.3. Consider Γ and i 2 I. If
(a) A and O are topological,
(b) ¾ is Caratheodory and vi is continuous,
(c) a 7! vi ± ¾(:;a) is a continuous mapping from A to B(Ω;F), and
(d) Λi : Ti £ A £ F ! [0;1] is such that Λi(ti;a;:) 2 ∆(Ω) for every (ti;a) 2 Ti £ A
12and Λi(:;:;E) is Caratheodory for every E 2 F,
then ui is Caratheodory.
Corollary 2.2.4. Given (a) and (d), if Ω and A are compact, and (b) is replaced by
(b0) ¾ and vi are continuous,
then ui is Caratheodory.
The properties of W, deﬁned by (1.3.3), are ingredients in the existence theorems
proved in Section 2.4. Lemma 2.2.5 speciﬁes assumptions on Γ guaranteeing that W is
continuous. It is proved by mimicking the proof of Lemma 2.2.1.
Lemma 2.2.5. Consider Γ. If
(a) Ω is compact metric; A, O and T are topological,
(b) ¾ and w are continuous, and
(c) Λ : T £ B(Ω) ! [0;1] is such that Λ(t;:) 2 ∆(Ω) for every t 2 T and Λ(:;E) is
continuous for every E 2 B(Ω),
then W is continuous.
Lemmas 2.2.6 provides conditions guaranteeing that W is Caratheodory. It is proved
by mimicking the proof of Lemma 2.2.3.
Lemma 2.2.6. Consider Γ. If
(a) A and O are topological,
(b) ¾ is Caratheodory and w is continuous, and
(c) Λ : T £ F ! [0;1] is such that Λ(t;:) 2 ∆(Ω) for every t 2 T and Λ(:;E) is
measurable for every E 2 F,
then W is Caratheodory.
2.3 Existence of equilibrium coordination plans
In this section we provide suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an ECP for Γ. The
following lemma is the key to Theorems 2.3.3 and 2.4.4, which are existence results for
ECPs and optimal ECPs respectively.
Lemma 2.3.1. Given Γ, if
(a) I is countable,
(b) T is a compact Hausdorﬀ space, and
for every i 2 I,
13(c) Ai is a convex, compact and metrizable subset of an l.c.s. Li, and
(d) ui is continuous and ui(t;a;b¡i;:) : Ai ! < is quasi-concave for every (t;a;b¡i) 2
T £ A £ A¡i,
then
(A) B is upper hemicontinuous, with nonempty, convex and compact values.
Deﬁne Ξ : T ) A by Ξ(t) = fa 2 A j a 2 B(t;a)g. Then,
(B) Ξ has nonempty compact values and GrΞ is closed in T £ A,
(C) Ξ is (weakly) measurable, and
(D) a : T ! A is an ECP for Γ iﬀ. a is a measurable selection from Ξ.
The following lemma is a slight variation on Lemma 2.3.1.
Lemma 2.3.2. Given Γ, if Assumptions (a), (c) and (d) of Lemma 2.3.1 are satisﬁed and
(b0) T is a separable metric space and (T;B(T)) is a complete measurable space,
then the conclusions of Lemma 2.3.1 hold.
Using the above results, we have an existence theorem for ECPs that exploits the
topological structure of T and the continuity of each expected utility function ui. See
Lemma 2.2.1 for conditions on Γ that ensure the continuity of ui.
Theorem 2.3.3. If Γ satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1 (resp. 2.3.2), then there
exists an ECP for Γ.
The second existence result dispenses with the topological structure of T and the
continuity of the expected utility functions, with the former replaced by measure-theoretic
requirements and the latter replaced by the requirement of a Caratheodory expected utility
function. We prepare for this result by proving the following lemma, which is the key
to Theorems 2.3.5 and 2.4.5, which are existence results for ECPs and optimal ECPs
respectively.
Lemma 2.3.4. Given Γ, if
(a) I is countable,
(b) (T;T ) is a complete measurable space, and
for every i 2 I,
(c) Ai is a convex compact subset of a separable Banach space Li with IntAi 6= ;,6
and
(d) ui : T £ A2 ! < is Caratheodory and ui(t;a;b¡i;:) : Ai ! < is quasi-concave for
every (t;a;b¡i) 2 T £ A £ A¡i,
14then there exists a mapping Á : T £ A ) A such that
(A) Á has nonempty, compact and convex values,
(B) Á is weakly measurable,
(C) Á(t;:) is upper hemicontinuous for every t 2 T, and
(D) a : T ! A is an ECP for Γ iﬀ. a is a measurable function such that a(t) 2 Á(t;a(t))
for every t 2 T.
Deﬁne Φ : T ) A by Φ(t) = fa 2 A j a 2 Á(t;a)g. Then,
(E) Φ has nonempty closed values,
(F) Φ is measurable, and
(G) a : T ! A is an ECP for Γ iﬀ. a is a measurable selection from Φ.
We immediately have the required result.
Theorem 2.3.5. If Γ satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.4, then there exists an ECP
for Γ.
2.4 Existence of optimal equilibrium plans
We now complete our program by providing suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
(ex post) optimal ECPs. Deﬁne G : T ) < by G(t) = W(ftg £ Ξ(t)) and g : T ) <
by g(t) = supG(t). Given t 2 T, G(t) is the set of conditional expected utilities for
the principal that can result from some ECP and g(t) is the supremum of these utilities.
Deﬁne C : T ) A by C(t) = W(t;:)¡1([g(t);1)) \ Ξ(t). Given t 2 T, C(t) is the set of
equilibrium action proﬁles that maximize the principal’s expected utility.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let Γ satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1. If W is Caratheodory,
then
(A) g is a measurable selection from G, and
(B) there exists a measurable selection a from Ξ such that g(t) = W(t;a(t)) for every
t 2 T; equivalently, there exists a measurable selection a from C.
Lemma 2.4.2. Let Γ satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.2. If W is Caratheodory, then
conclusions (A) and (B) of Lemma 2.4.1 hold. Moreover, C is measurable with nonempty
closed values.
Continuity assumptions on W yield richer properties of g and C.
15Lemma 2.4.3. Suppose Γ satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1 (resp. 2.3.2).
(A) If W is upper semicontinuous, then g is an upper semicontinuous selection from
G, and consequently, g is measurable.
(B) If T is compact metric and W is continuous, then there exists T0 ½ T such that
(i) T0 = \n2NTn, where each Tn is open and dense in T,
(ii) T0 is a Baire space of second category that is dense in T, while T ¡ T0 is a set of
ﬁrst category; T0 2 B(T) and T ¡ T0 2 B(T), and
(iii) g : T0 ! < is a continuous selection from G : T0 ) < and C : T0 ) A is upper
hemicontinuous.
Clearly, the upper semicontinuity of W in (A) is distinct from the Caratheodory
property: one, neither implies, nor is implied by, the other. However, upper semicontinuity
of W does imply that W is measurable. (B) is a generic continuity result. However, note
that, while T0 is “large” topologically, it is not necessarily so in other senses. For instance,
consider the concrete model T = [0;1] with the Lebesgue measure. It is possible to
construct T0 ½ [0;1] with the properties listed above but with Leb(T0) = 0, i.e., T0 is
negligible in the measure-theoretic sense.
Theorem 2.4.4. Suppose Γ satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1 (resp. 2.3.2).
(A) If W is Caratheodory, then there exists an optimal ECP for Γ.
(B) If T is compact metric, W is continuous and jC(t)j = 1 for every t in an open and
dense subset of T, then there exists an optimal ECP for Γ that is continuous on T0 ½ T,
where T0 has the same properties as T0, as listed in Lemma 2.4.3(B).
The following is an analogous result in the setting of Lemma 2.3.4 and Theorem 2.3.5.
Theorem 2.4.5. If Γ satisﬁes the hypotheses of Lemma 2.3.4 and W is Caratheodory,
then there exists an optimal ECP for Γ.
2.5 Analysis of the application
In this section, we provide assumptions about the primitive data Γ¤ that enable the
application of the results of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 to prove the existence of (optimal) equi-
librium coordination plans for Γ¤. As is to be expected, the trade-oﬀ evident in Section
2.3 will be reﬂected here. Roughly, the trade-oﬀ is that weaker assumptions on the action
spaces Ai have to be paid for by stronger continuity assumptions on payoﬀ functions ui
16and stronger assumptions regarding the principal’s signal space T. The ﬁrst result identi-
ﬁes an environment, speciﬁed by Assumptions (a), (b), (c) and (e), and a set of contracts,
speciﬁed by Assumption (d), that satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1.
Before stating our ﬁrst result regarding Γ¤, we develop some notation. In the following
two results, fLi j i 2 Ig is a family of topological vector spaces. Deﬁne L =
Q
i2I Li; given
the product topology, it is easily veriﬁed that L is a topological vector space. If each Li
is a barreled space, then so is L ([28], IV.4.3).7 Given a topological vector space M, let L
be the space of continuous linear functions f : L ! M. Given f 2 L and A ½ L, let fA
denote the restriction of f to A. Let LA = ffA j f 2 Lg. Let e : MA £ A ! M be the
evaluation function deﬁned by e(f;a) = f(a). We now state our ﬁrst result.
Theorem 2.5.1. Given Γ¤, if
(a) I is countable, and
for every i 2 I,
(b) Ai is a convex, compact and metrizable barrel in a barreled space Li,
(c) Oi is a compact subset of a normed space M,
(d) Ti = f® + fA j ® 2 M ^ f 2 Lg \ OA
i , and
(e) v¤
i is continuous and quasi-concave,
then there exists an ECP for Γ¤. Moreover, if W is Caratheodory, then there exists an
optimal ECP for Γ¤.
The contracts speciﬁed in Assumption (d) may be interpreted as two-part tariﬀs. We
now consider Γ¤ with the intention of applying Lemma 2.3.4.
Theorem 2.5.2. Given Γ¤, if
(a) I is countable, and
for every i 2 I,
(b) Ai is a convex compact subset of a separable Banach space Li with IntAi 6= ;,
(c) Oi is a convex, separable and metrizable subset of a topological vector space,





i j f(a¡i;:) is linearg
and
(e) v¤
i is continuous and quasi-concave,
17then there exists an ECP for Γ¤. Moreover, if W is Caratheodory, then there exists an
optimal ECP for Γ¤.
3. The organization design problem
3.1 Principal’s Role (®)
In this section we oﬀer some observations on the organization design problem described
by Role (®) in Section 1.1. We take as exogenously given the data so designated in Section




i);¾d j i 2 Ig. Let ad be an
optimal ECP given design d. Finding and implementing ad characterizes the principal’s
Role (¯).
Suppose D is the set of organization designs and an optimal ECP ad exists for each
d 2 D. As the example of Section 3.2 will show, the speciﬁcation of D depends on the
particular design context and the “information technology” (e.g., the language, vocabulary
and grammar constraining the principal’s messages to the agents) and “outcome-generation
technology” (e.g., the production technology of a ﬁrm) relevant to that context. Given D,
the principal’s problem of choosing a design amounts to the problem of ﬁnding d 2 D such
that Z
Ω








for every d0 2 D.
3.2 Example: designing a ﬁrm
Consider a ﬁrm with I as the set of agents, whose production operations consist of
running the set of activities J; let I and J be ﬁnite. We deﬁne a design f((Ti;Ti);si;Ai);¾ j
i 2 Ig for this ﬁrm.
For every agent and every activity, let [0;1] be the set of feasible activity levels. Agent












where Ji ½ J. If a 2 Ai, then aj is interpreted as being agent i’s contribution to activity
j 2 J. If j 2 Ji, then agent i cannot contribute to activity j. Thus, J ¡ Ji is agent i’s
span of control in this design.
18Fix the mapping ¾¤ : Ω £ <J ! O, where O is the outcome space and ¾¤(!;x)
is the outcome that results when the state is ! and x is the proﬁle of activity levels at
which the various activities are operated. ¾¤, which represents the ﬁrm’s technology, is
exogenously given and ﬁxed. Given the action spaces fAi j i 2 Ig, the outcome mapping
¾ : Ω £ A ! O is given by ¾(!;a) = ¾¤(!;
P
i2I ai). Clearly, the ﬁrm’s “outcome-
generation technology” is speciﬁed by the set of activities J, the production function ¾¤,
and the activity aggregation hypothesis that the proﬁle of aggregate activity levels is
separable across activities, and for each activity, the levels are additive across agents.
Suppose the state space is Ω = [0;1]K, where K is ﬁnite; for simplicity, let T = Ω and
let s be the identity mapping on Ω, i.e., the principal is fully informed about the state. The
state may consist of data such as the ﬁrm’s technology, the prevailing conditions in various
input and output markets, and the contractual relations between the ﬁrm and buyers,
suppliers and workers. Given Ki ½ K, suppose agent i’s information set is Ti = [0;1]Ki
and si = ¼Ki, where ¼Ki projects [0;1]K on [0;1]Ki. Thus, Ki is the set of information
variables whose outcomes are communicated to agent i. The family fKi j i 2 Ig describes
the ﬁrm’s management information system. Clearly, this restricts the communication
possibilities as a given agent either observes a given information variable or not; it is not
possible, for instance, for an agent to observe the sum of two information variables instead
of the two variables. Note that, while each agent’s “message space” is uncountable, the
“dimension” of the message space is constrained to be ﬁnite; so, while the “vocabulary”
is rich, the “grammar” restricts the kinds of messages that can be fashioned using the
vocabulary.
Suppose the set of designs D is identiﬁed with the set (2J £ 2K)I, i.e., we accept
the above-mentioned technological and communication constraints as given. Then, the
number of ways of assigning action spaces and information are ﬁnite. Thus, the number
of designs is ﬁnite and the problem of choosing among them is quite straightforward.
3.3 Some examples
In this section, we show via examples that the extent of information-sharing implied
by the optimal design varies with the underlying setting. Consequently, a general mono-
tonicity property connecting the optimal design and the extent of information sharing
does not hold. The following data is common to all three examples: Ω = T = f!1;!2g,
F = T = 2Ω, P = (1=2;1=2), s : Ω ! T is the identity mapping, O = fo1;o2;o3;o4g,
19O = 2O, I = f1;2g, A1 = fU;Dg, A2 = fL;Rg, ¸ is given by ¸(!;a) = 1=8 for every












respectively. For instance, if the state is !1 and the action choices are (D;R), then the
outcome is o4. Given the purpose of these examples, it is natural to keep the assignment
of action spaces unchanged, while varying only the information dissemination mappings.
Example 3.3.1. Suppose the agents’ payoﬀs are generated by the mapping




(1;1); if o = o1
(4;0); if o = o2
(0;4); if o = o3
(2;2); if o = o4
and w : O ! < by w(o) = v1(o) + v2(o).













respectively; this is not to say that the agents are playing the above bimatrix games in the
two diﬀerent states. If both agents have full information, i.e., T1 = T2 = Ω, and s1 and s2
are the identity mappings, then the optimal ECP is
a(!) =
½
(U;L); if ! = !1
(D;R); if ! = !2
(3:3:2)
Consequently, the payoﬀ proﬁle is (1;1) in both states, resulting in the principal’s payoﬀ
being 2 in both states. On the other hand, if the agents are given no information, say
T1 = T2 = f!1g (so that s1 and s2 are constant mappings), then
a(!) =
½
(U;R); if ! = !1
(D;L); if ! = !2
(3:3:3)
is an optimal ECP, which results in the principal getting payoﬀ 4 in both states. It is clear
from the structure of payoﬀs that the principal cannot improve upon the latter information
structure.
20Example 3.3.4. Suppose the agents’ payoﬀs are generated by the mapping




(2;2); if o = o1
(2;1); if o = o2
(1;2); if o = o3
(0;0); if o = o4
and w : O ! < by w(o) = v1(o) + v2(o).












respectively. If both agents have full information, then the optimal ECP is given by
(3.3.2), resulting in the principal’s payoﬀ being 4 in both states. On the other hand, if the
agents are given no information, then neither recommendation (U;L), nor recommendation
(D;R), will induce obedience by them. Thus, in this case, the principal’s expected payoﬀ
from any ECP must be less than 4; e.g., (3.3.3) is an ECP for this situation. It is clear from
the structure of payoﬀs that the principal cannot improve upon the former information
structure.
Example 3.3.5. Suppose the agents’ payoﬀs are generated by the mapping




(4;4); if o = o1
(7;2); if o = o2
(0;6); if o = o3
(4;4); if o = o4
and w : O ! < by w(o) = v1(o) + v2(o).












respectively. It is easy to conﬁrm that, either if both agents are fully informed about the
state or neither is informed about the state, then the optimal ECP is given by (3.3.2).
Consequently, the principal’s payoﬀ is 8 in both states. A third possible information struc-
ture is that agent 1 is fully informed about the state but agent 2 is given no information,
21i.e., T1 = Ω and s1 is the identity mapping, while T2 = f!1g. In this situation, (3.3.3) is
an optimal ECP. Thus, the optimal information structure in this example is intermediate
between full revelation of the state, as in Example 3.3.4, and no revelation of information,
as in Example 3.3.1.
4. Concluding remarks
We have studied a model of an organization that generalizes the classical notion of a
team. Using this model, we deﬁne the notion of “organization design” in terms of choosing
a system of information dissemination within the organization and assigning actions spaces
to the members of the organization. The principal, i.e., the designer of the organization, is
required to choose an organization design whose outcomes are optimal from the principal’s
perspective. The natural way to solve the problem is to adopt a two-step procedure. First,
given a particular design, ﬁnd the best outcome mapping that satisﬁes various informa-
tional and incentive constraints. Secondly, compare the best outcome mappings derived in
the ﬁrst step to arrive at the best design.
This paper is devoted to providing conditions that ensure the solvability of the problem
entailed by the ﬁrst step. We provide three sets of suﬃcient conditions. We also provide an
application in which the principal and each agent are linked by an incentive contract. The
setting of the application is such that the privateness of individual contracts is unimportant,
but the very nature of the contracts is crucial for the existence of (optimal) ECPs. For
instance, in one version of the application, restricting the class of contracts to a subset of
aﬃne mappings (a generalization of “two-part tariﬀs”) is suﬃcient for guaranteeing the
existence of optimal ECPs. In addition, we provide conditions on the primitives of the
model that ensure the satisfaction of the critical reduced-form assumptions that are made
in the main theorems. These lemmas may be of independent interest.
The second step optimization involved in completing the principal’s program is unﬁn-
ished business because the class of objects over which one must optimize, i.e., organization
designs, is generally unstructured and there does not seem to be a way to reduce it to
some canonical setting. As we have argued in Section 3.2, the set of feasible designs is
intimately linked to the particular context and only a piecemeal theory may be possible.
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Proof of Lemma 1.3.5. Let a;b 2 E, with a being an ex post optimal ECP, and let
¹ 2 ∆(T £ Ω) be the unique measure such that ¹(E £ F) =
R
E P ± s¡1(dt)Λ(t;F) for
E 2 T and F 2 F. By deﬁnition, ¹(T £ :) =
R










By the non-Cartesian version of the Fubini-Stone theorem ([27], Exercise 6.2.3),
Z
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where the second equality is a consequence of Λ being regular. By an analogous argument,
R
Ω P(d!)w ±¾(!;b±s(!)) =
R
T P ±s¡1(dt)W(t;b(t)). As W(t;a(t)) ¸ W(t;b(t)) for every
t 2 T, we have
Z
Ω







P ± s¡1(dt)W(t;b(t)) =
Z
Ω
P(d!)w ± ¾(!;b ± s(!))
as required.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.1. The proof proceeds in a number of steps.
(i) As Ω is compact by (a), it follows that <Ω = C(Ω) and the compact-open topology
of <Ω is metrized by the supremum norm ([10], XII.8.2). With this norm, C(Ω) is a Banach
space ([11], V.7.17), and therefore, a Baire space ([10], XIV.4.1).
(ii) Let rca(Ω) be the set of regular countably additive real-valued set functions on
(Ω;B(Ω)). Given the total variation norm, rca(Ω) is a Banach space ([11], III.7.4) with
the closed unit sphere S. By the Riesz representation theorem ([11], IV.6.3), rca(Ω) is
isometrically isomorphic to the conjugate space of C(Ω). As Ω is metric by (a), we have
∆(Ω) ½ S ([11], III.9.22).
(iii) As Ω is compact by (a), and vi and ¾ are continuous by (b), we have vi±¾(:;b) 2
C(Ω) for every b 2 A. For every (t;a) 2 T £ A, Λi(si(t);a;:) 2 ∆(Ω) ½ S. Thus,
23G : T £ A2 ! S £ C(Ω) is well-deﬁned by G(t;a;b) = (Λi(si(t);a;:);vi ± ¾(:;b)). Deﬁne
L : S £ C(Ω) ! < by L(¹;f) =
R
Ω ¹(d!)f(!). As ui = L ± G, it suﬃces to show that G
and L are continuous.
For the rest of this proof, equip rca(Ω) with the C(Ω) topology ([11], V.3.2). Conse-
quently, by (ii) and Alaoglu’s theorem ([11], V.4.2), S is compact.
(iv) Consider a net (t®;a®) ½ T £A converging to (t;a). Deﬁne the net (¸®) ½ ∆(Ω)
by ¸®(:) = Λi(si(t®);a®;:) and let ¸(:) = Λi(si(t);a;:). Consider E 2 B(Ω) such that
¸( ¯ E¡IntE) = 0. Using (b) and (c), we have ¸®(E) = Λi(si(t®);a®;E) ! Λi(si(t);a;E) =
¸(E). Thus, (¸®) converges to ¸ ([26], II.6.1). It follows that G1 is continuous. Step (i)
and (b) imply that G2 is continuous ([10], XII.3.1).
(v) It remains to show that L is continuous. By the deﬁnition of the C(Ω) topology,
L(:;f) is continuous for every f 2 C(Ω). Consider ¹ 2 S and f 2 C(Ω). To show the
continuity of L(¹;:) at f, consider a sequence (fn) ½ C(Ω) converging to f. As fn ! f
uniformly, fn ! f pointwise. As ¹ is countably additive, Lebesgue’s theorem implies
limn"1 L(¹;fn) = L(¹;f). Thus, L(¹;:) is continuous for every ¹ 2 S. Therefore, the
identity L(¹;f)¡L(¹0;f0) = L(¹¡¹0;f ¡f0)+L(¹¡¹0;f0)+L(¹0;f ¡f0) implies that
it is suﬃcient to show that L is continuous at (0;0) 2 S £ C(Ω).
Given f 2 C(Ω), as S is compact and L(:;f) is continuous, L(S;f) ½ < is compact,
and therefore, bounded. It follows that
[
¹2S




is bounded for every ﬁnite set F ½ C(Ω). Therefore, fL(¹;:) j ¹ 2 Sg is a bounded subset
of L(C(Ω);<) in the topology of pointwise convergence ([28], III.3.3). From this, and the
fact that C(Ω) is a Baire space by (i), it follows that fL(¹;:) j ¹ 2 Sg is an equicontinuous
set of mappings ([28], III.4.2). So, given an open neighborhood W of 0 2 <, there exists
an open neighborhood V of 0 2 C(Ω) such that L(¹;V ) ½ W for every ¹ 2 S, i.e.,
L(S £ V ) ½ W, as required.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2. Given (a;b) 2 A2, the measurability of ui(:;a;b) follows from
the non-Cartesian version of the Fubini-Stone theorem ([27], Exercise 6.2.3) and the fact
that si is measurable.
Given t 2 T, ui(t;:;:) is continuous by an argument that is identical to that of Lemma
2.2.1, modulo trivial modiﬁcations as t is ﬁxed in this argument.
24Proof of Lemma 2.2.3. Given (a;b) 2 A2, the measurability of ui(:;a;b) follows from
the non-Cartesian version of the Fubini-Stone theorem ([27], Exercise 6.2.3) and the fact
that si is measurable.
We now ﬁx t 2 T and show the continuity of ui(t;:;:).
(i) Equipped with the supremum norm, B(Ω;F) is a Banach space ([11], IV.5), and
therefore, a Baire space ([10], XIV.4.1).
(ii) Let ba(Ω) be the set of bounded additive real-valued set functions on (Ω;F). Given
the total variation norm, ba(Ω) is a Banach space ([11], III.7). Let S be the closed unit
sphere of ba(Ω). ba(Ω) is the conjugate space of B(Ω;F) ([11], IV.5.1). Given ¹ 2 ba(Ω)
and f 2 B(Ω;F), let h¹;fi =
R
Ω ¹(d!)f(!).
Henceforth, we equip ba(Ω) with the B(Ω;F) topology ([11], V.3.2). By Alaoglu’s
theorem ([11], V.4.2), S is compact.
(iii) By deﬁnition, Λi(si(t);a;:) 2 ∆(Ω) ½ S for every a 2 A. This and (c) imply
that G : A2 ! S £ B(Ω;F) is well-deﬁned by G(a;b) = (Λi(si(t);a;:);vi ± ¾(:;b)). Deﬁne
L : S £ B(Ω;F) ! < by L(¹;f) = h¹;fi. Clearly, ui(t;:;:) = L ± G(:;:). Thus, it suﬃces
to show that G and L are continuous.
(iv) Continuity of G2 follows directly from (c). We show that G1 is continuous.
Consider a net (a®) ½ A converging to a. Deﬁne the net (¸®) by ¸®(:) = Λi(si(t);a®;:)





Λi(si(t);a®;E) = Λi(si(t);a;E) = h¸;1Ei
Bilinearity of h:;:i implies that an analogous argument holds when 1E is replaced by a
ﬁnite linear combination of functions drawn from f1E j E 2 Fg. Consider f 2 B(Ω;F).
By deﬁnition, there exists a sequence of functions (fm) converging uniformly to f where
each fm is a ﬁnite linear combination of functions drawn from f1E j E 2 Fg. Then
lim
® h¸®;fi = lim
® h¸®;lim












The ﬁrst and last equalities follow from the deﬁnition of f. As ¸® and ¸ are countably
additive, the second and ﬁfth equalities follow from Lebesgue’s theorem. The third equality
is justiﬁed by the uniform convergence of (fm) to f ([11], I.7.6). The fourth equality follows
from the preceding argument as fm is a ﬁnite linear combination of indicator functions.
(v) It remains to show that L is continuous. By the deﬁnition of the B(Ω;F) topology,
L(:;f) is continuous for every f 2 B(Ω;F). Consider ¹ 2 S and f 2 B(Ω;F). To show
25the continuity of L(¹;:) at f, consider a sequence (fn) ½ B(Ω;F) converging to f. As
fn ! f uniformly, fn ! f pointwise. As ¹ is countably additive, Lebesgue’s theorem
implies limn"1 L(¹;fn) = L(¹;f). Thus, L(¹;:) is continuous for every ¹ 2 S. Therefore,
the identity L(¹;f)¡L(¹0;f0) = L(¹¡¹0;f ¡f0)+L(¹¡¹0;f0)+L(¹0;f ¡f0) implies
that it is suﬃcient to show that L is continuous at (0;0) 2 S £ B(Ω;F).
Given f 2 B(Ω;F), as S is compact and L(:;f) is continuous, L(S;f) ½ < is compact,
and therefore, bounded. It follows that
[
¹2S




is bounded for every ﬁnite set F ½ B(Ω;F). Therefore, fL(¹;:) j ¹ 2 Sg is a bounded
subset of L(B(Ω;F);<) in the topology of pointwise convergence ([28], III.3.3). It follows
from this and (i) that fL(¹;:) j ¹ 2 Sg is an equicontinuous set of mappings ([28], III.4.2).
So, given an open neighborhood W of 0 2 <, there exists an open neighborhood V of
0 2 B(Ω;F) such that L(¹;V ) ½ W for every ¹ 2 S, i.e., L(S £ V ) ½ W, as required.
Proof of Corollary 2.2.4. Clearly, hypotheses (a), (b) and (d) are satisﬁed. We show
that (c) is satisﬁed as well. (b0) implies that vi±¾ : Ω£A ! < is continuous. Consequently,
a 7! vi ±¾(:;a) is a continuous mapping from A into <Ω ([10], XII.3.1), where <Ω is given
the compact-open topology. As Ω is compact, <Ω = C(Ω) ½ B(Ω;B(Ω)) and the compact-
open topology on <Ω is metrized by the supremum norm ([10], XII.8.2).
Proof of Lemma 2.2.6. Given a 2 A, the measurability of W(:;a) follows from the
non-Cartesian version of the Fubini-Stone theorem ([27], Exercise 6.2.3).
Fix t 2 T and consider a net (a®) ½ A converging to a. Then w±¾(:;a®) ! w±¾(:;a)
pointwise. By Lebesgue’s theorem, W(t;a®) ! W(t;a).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. (A) Assumptions (c) and (d), and Theorems VI.3.1 and VI.3.2
in [4] imply that Bi is upper hemicontinuous, with nonempty and compact values. (d)
also implies that Bi has convex values. Assumption (c) implies that A is convex, compact
and metric. It follows that B is upper hemicontinuous ([12], Lemma A.4), with nonempty,
convex and compact values.
(B) As the properties listed in (A) also hold for B(t;:) : A ) A for every t 2 T, Ξ has
nonempty values by Theorem 4 in [6]. Deﬁne f : T £A ! T £diagA2 by f(t;a) = (t;a;a).
As A is metrizable, it is Hausdorﬀ, and therefore, diag A2 is closed in A2. (A) implies that
GrB is closed in T £A2. Thus, GrB\(T £diagA2) is closed in T £A2. As f is continuous,
26GrΞ = f¡1(GrB \ (T £ diagA2)) is closed in T £ A. Thus, Ξ has closed values. As A is
compact, Ξ has compact values.
(C) Let ¼1 project T £ A on T. Let E be closed in A. As T and A are compact, E
and T £E are compact; moreover, (B) implies GrΞ is compact. Therefore, GrΞ\(T £E)
is compact. As ¼1 is continuous, Ξ¡(E) = ¼1(GrΞ \ (T £ E)) is compact. Since T is
Hausdorﬀ, Ξ¡(E) is closed in T. Therefore, Ξ¡(E) 2 B(T). Consequently, Ξ is measurable.
Thus, Ξ is weakly measurable ([15], Theorem 3.5(i)).
(D) follows from the deﬁnitions.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2. (A), (B) and (D) are proved as in Lemma 2.3.1.
(C) Deﬁne ¼2 : T £ A ! A by ¼2(t;a) = a and Ã : T £ A ) A by Ã(t;a) =
B(t;a) \ ¼2(t;a). Note that GrΞ = f(t;a) 2 T £ A j a 2 B(t;a)g = f(t;a) 2 T £ A j
Ã(t;a) 6= ;g = Ã¡(A). (A) implies that GrB is closed in T £ A2. Using (b0) and Lemma
B.2, GrB 2 B(T £ A2) = B(T) £ B(A2). Thus, B is weakly measurable ([15], Theorem
3.5(iii)). As ¼2 is continuous, it is weakly measurable. Thus, as ¼2 and B have closed
values, Ã is measurable ([15], Theorem 4.1) and GrΞ = Ã¡(A) 2 B(T £A) = B(T)£B(A).
So, (C) follows from Theorem 3.5(iii) in [15].
Proof of Theorem 2.3.3. This follows from Lemma 2.3.1 (resp. 2.3.2) and Theorem 5.1
in [15].
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4. In order to focus on the main steps, the proofs of some of the
following arguments are collected in Appendix B. For steps (1) to (3), ﬁx i 2 I.
(1) Deﬁne Ui : T £ A £ Ai ! < by Ui(t;a;b) = ui(t;a;a¡i;b) ¡ ui(t;a;a) and Fi :
T £A ) Ai by Fi(t;a) = fb 2 Ai j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g. Let Di = f(t;a) 2 T £A j Fi(t;a) 6= ;g.
For every t 2 T, let Dt
i = fa 2 A j (t;a) 2 Dig, and for every a 2 A, let Da
i = ft 2 T j
(t;a) 2 Dig.
(2) By Lemma B.4, Fi(t;:) is lower hemicontinuous for every t 2 T. By Lemma B.5,
Fi has open convex values in Ai, IntFi(t;a) 6= ; for every (t;a) 2 Di, and Fi is weakly
measurable. By Lemma B.6, Di 2 T £ B(A); Dt
i is open in A for every t 2 T; and, for
every a 2 A, Da
i 2 T .
(3) It follows from (2) and Theorem 3.2 in [17] that there exists fi : Di ! Ai such
that (i) fi(t;a) 2 Fi(t;a) for every (t;a) 2 Di; (ii) fi(t;:) : Dt
i ! Ai is continuous for
every t 2 T; and (iii) fi(:;a) : Da
i ! Ai is (T \ Da
i )=B(Ai) measurable for every a 2 A.
Deﬁne Ái : T £ A ) Ai by
Ái(t;a) =
½
ffi(t;a)g; if (t;a) 2 Di
Ai; if (t;a) 2 (T £ A) ¡ Di
27Clearly, Ái has nonempty, convex and compact values. Deﬁne Á : T £ A ) A by Á(t;a) =
Q
i2I Ái(t;a). We now conﬁrm our claims.
(A) These properties are inherited from the mappings fÁi j i 2 Ig.
(B) Let E be open in Ai. If E = ;, then Á
¡
i (E) = ; 2 T £B(A). Suppose E 6= ;. Then
Á
¡
i (E) = [(T£A)¡Di][f
¡1
i (E). As Di 2 T £B(A) by (2), we have (T£A)¡Di 2 T £B(A).
fi is [(T £B(A))\Di]=B(Ai) measurable ([17], Lemma 4.12). Therefore, f
¡1
i (E) = C\Di
for some C 2 T £ B(A). As Di 2 T £ B(A) by (2), it follows that f
¡1
i (E) 2 T £ B(A),
and therefore, Á
¡
i (E) 2 T £ B(A).
Suppose E belongs to the basis for A, i.e., E =
Q
i2I Ei, where Ei is open in Ai for
every i 2 I. Using (a), we have Á¡(E) = \i2IÁ
¡
i (Ei) 2 T £ B(A).
Let E be open in A. As A is second-countable, E = [j2JEj for a countable family
fEj j j 2 Jg drawn from the basis for A. Therefore, Á¡(E) = [j2JÁ¡(Ej) 2 T £ B(A).
As Á is weakly measurable, Á is measurable ([15], Theorem 3.5(ii)).
(C) Fix t 2 T and i 2 I. Consider E open in Ai. If E = Ai, then Ái(t;:)+(E) = A
is open in A. If E 6= Ai, then Ái(t;:)+(E) = fi(t;:)¡1(E). As fi(t;:) is continuous by (3),
fi(t;:)¡1(E) = Dt
i \ U for some U open in A. As Dt
i is open in A by (2), it follows that
Ái(t;:)+(E) = Dt
i \U is open in A. Thus, Ái(t;:) : A ) Ai is upper hemicontinuous. Using
(a), Á(t;:) : A ) A is upper hemicontinuous ([12], Lemma A.4).
(D) Suppose a : T ! A is a measurable function such that a(t) 2 Á(t;a(t)) for
every t 2 T. Fix t 2 T and i 2 I. If (t;a(t)) 2 Di, then Ái(t;a(t)) = ffi(t;a(t))g. As
ai(t) 2 Ái(t;a(t)), this implies ai(t) = fi(t;a(t)) 2 Fi(t;a(t)). Thus, Ui(t;a(t);ai(t)) > 0,
which is a contradiction. So, (t;a(t)) 2 (T £ A) ¡ Di. This implies Fi(t;a(t)) = ;, i.e.,
Ui(t;a(t);b) · 0 for every b 2 Ai. Consequently, a is an ECP.
Conversely, suppose a : T ! A is an ECP. By deﬁnition, a is measurable. Fix t 2 T
and i 2 I. By deﬁnition, Ui(t;a(t);b) · 0 for every b 2 Ai. Thus, Fi(t;a(t)) = ;.
Consequently, (t;a(t)) 2 (T £ A) ¡ Di and ai(t) 2 Ai = Ái(t;a(t)). Thus, a(t) 2 Á(t;a(t))
for every t 2 T.
(E) Theorem 4 in [6] implies that Φ has nonempty values. We show that A ¡ Φ(t)
is open in A. Let a 2 A ¡ Φ(t). It follows that a 2 A ¡ Á(t;a). As A is Hausdorﬀ and
Á has compact values, Á has closed values. As A is compact Hausdorﬀ, it is normal, and
therefore, regular. Consequently, there exist open neighborhoods U1 of a and U2 of Á(t;a),
such that U1 \ U2 = ;. As Á(t;:) is upper hemicontinuous, Á(t;:)+(U2) is open in A. Set
V = U1 \ Á(t;:)+(U2). Note that a 2 V and V is open in A. Moreover, if y 2 V , then
28Á(t;y) ½ U2 ½ A ¡ U1 ½ A ¡ V . Therefore, y 2 A ¡ Á(t;y), i.e., y 2 A ¡ Φ(t). Thus,
V ½ A ¡ Φ(t).
(F) Deﬁne ¼2 : T £A ! A by ¼2(t;a) = a. If E is open in A, then ¼
¡1
2 (E) = T £E 2
T £B(A). Therefore, ¼2 is weakly measurable. By (B), Á is weakly measurable. Therefore,
Ã : T £ A ) A, deﬁned by Ã(t;a) = Á(t;a) \ ¼2(t;a) = Á(t;a) \ fag, is measurable ([15],
Theorem 4.1). Thus, GrΦ = f(t;a) 2 T £ A j a 2 Á(t;a)g = f(t;a) 2 T £ A j Ã(t;a) 6=
;g = Ã¡(A) 2 T £ B(A). As (T;T ) is complete, Φ is measurable ([15], Theorem 3.5(iii)).
(G) follows from (D) and the deﬁnition of Φ.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.5. This follows from Lemma 2.3.4 and Theorem 5.1 in [15].
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1. (A) By Lemma 2.3.1, Ξ is measurable and has nonempty com-
pact values. Therefore, G is measurable ([15], Theorems 6.5 and 3.5(ii)), with nonempty
compact values. Therefore, g(t) 2 G(t) for every t 2 T. Moreover, g is measurable ([15],
Theorems 3.5(i) and 6.6).
(B) follows from Theorem 7.1 in [15].
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. The proofs of claims (A) and (B) follow the lines of the proof
of Lemma 2.4.1. We show the claimed properties of C. Consider t 2 T. (B) implies that
C(t) 6= ;. As W(t;:) is continuous, W(t;:)¡1([g(t);1)) is closed in A. As Ξ(t) is compact,
C(t) is closed.
As g is measurable and W is Caratheodory, W¡g is Caratheodory. Thus, the mapping
t7)W(t;:)¡1([g(t);1)) = fa 2 A j W(t;a) ¡ g(t) ¸ 0g is measurable ([15], Theorems 6.4).
By Lemma 2.3.1, Ξ is measurable. Therefore, C is measurable ([15], Theorem 4.1).
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3. (A) By Lemmas 2.3.1 (resp. 2.3.2), Ξ has nonempty compact
values and GrΞ is closed in T £ A. As A is compact Hausdorﬀ, this means Ξ is upper
hemicontinuous. Thus, t 7! g(t) = supW(ftg £ Ξ(t)) = supfW(t;a) j a 2 Ξ(t)g is upper
semicontinuous ([4], Theorem VI.3.2).
Consider the set [c;1) for c 2 <. As g is upper semicontinuous, g¡1([c;1)) is closed
in T. Consequently, g¡1([c;1)) 2 B(T). This implies g is measurable as the family
f[c;1) j c 2 <g generates B(<).
(B) As T and A are compact metric, they are complete and separable. As Ξ is upper
hemicontinuous, there exists T0 ½ T such that (i) is satisﬁed and Ξ : T0 ) A is continuous
([3], Theorem 1.4.13). (iii) follows immediately ([4], Theorems VI.3.1 and VI.3.2). We
now conﬁrm (ii).
29It follows immediately from (i) that T0 2 B(T) and T ¡ T0 2 B(T). As T is compact
metric, T is complete, and therefore a Baire space ([10], XIV.4.1). T is of second category as
it is a nonempty Baire space ([10], XI.10.5). (i) implies that T0 is topologically complete
([10], XIV.8.3), and therefore, a Baire space ([10], XIV.4.1). (i) also implies that T0 is
dense in T ([10], XI.10.1). As each Tn is open and dense in T, T ¡ Tn is closed in T
and Int(T ¡ Tn) = ;, i.e., each T ¡ Tn is nowhere dense. As T ¡ T0 = T ¡ \n2NTn =
[n2N(T ¡ Tn), T ¡ T0 is a set of ﬁrst category. If T0 also is of ﬁrst category, then T is of
ﬁrst category, a contradiction. So, T0 is of second category.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.4. (A) By Lemma 2.4.1 (resp. 2.4.2), there exists measurable
selection a from Ξ such that g(t) = W(t;a(t)) for every t 2 T. By Lemma 2.3.1 (resp.
2.3.2), a is an ECP for Γ. Let b be an ECP for Γ. By Lemma 2.3.1 (resp. 2.3.2), b is
a selection from Ξ. Thus, W(t;b(t)) 2 G(t) for every t 2 T. Consequently, W(t;b(t)) ·
supG(t) = g(t) = W(t;a(t)) for every t 2 T. The result follows from Lemma 1.3.5.
(B) Using (A), there exists an optimal ECP. Clearly, this ECP is a selection from
C. Suppose T¤ is an open and dense subset of T such that jC(t)j = 1 for every t 2 T¤.
Copying the argument of Lemma 2.4.3(B), T0 = T¤ \ T0 has all the claimed properties.
Using Lemma 2.4.3(B), C is upper hemicontinuous on T0. The result follows as C is
singleton-valued on T0.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1. If the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.1 are satisﬁed, then the
result follows from Theorems 2.3.3 and 2.4.5.
(a) and (b) imply that Assumptions (a) and (c) of Lemma 2.3.1 are satisﬁed. (1.4.1)
implies ui(t;a;b) = v¤
i ± ti(b) = v¤
i ± e(ti;b). As (b) implies A is compact, e is continuous
([10], XII.2.4). Therefore, (e) implies that ui is continuous. Assumption (d) of Lemma
2.3.1 is satisﬁed as (d) and (e) imply that ui(t;a;b¡i;:) = v¤
i ± ti(b¡i;:) is quasi-concave.
It remains to verify that Assumption (b) of Lemma 2.3.1 is satisﬁed.
Suppose (1) Ti is closed in MA, and (2) Ti is equicontinuous on A.
(c) implies that MA is Hausdorﬀ ([10], XII.1.3), and therefore, so is Ti. Let Ti(a) =
fti(a) 2 Oi j ti 2 Tig for a 2 A. (c) implies that Ti(a) is compact for every a 2 A. This
fact, combined with (c) and (2), implies that Ti is compact ([10], XII.6.4). Therefore, (1)
implies Ti = Ti is compact. As T =
Q
i2I Ti, Assumption (b) of Lemma 2.3.1 is satisﬁed.
We note the following preliminary fact before verifying (1) and (2).
(0) Suppose f 2 MA is linear on A, i.e., if a;b 2 A, ¸;¹ 2 < and ¸a + ¹b 2 A, then
f(¸a+¹b) = ¸f(a)+¹f(b). We show that f has a unique extension ¯ f 2 L, or equivalently,
f = ¯ fA.
30Consider a 2 L. As A is a barrel, it is radial. Therefore, there exists ¸ > 0 such
that ¸¡1a 2 A. Deﬁne ¯ f(a) = ¸f(¸¡1a). Note that, if ¹ > 0 is also such that ¹¡1a 2 A,
then ¸f(¸¡1a) = ¸f(¹¡1¹¸¡1a) = ¸¹¸¡1f(¹¡1a) = ¹f(¹¡1a). Thus, the deﬁnition of
¯ f is independent of the choice of ¸. We now check that ¯ f is linear. Consider a;b 2 L.
As A is radial, there exists ¸ > 0 such that ¸¡1a;¸¡1b;¸¡1(a + b) 2 A. Therefore,
¯ f(a + b) = ¸f(¸¡1(a + b)) = ¸f(¸¡1a + ¸¡1b) = ¸[f(¸¡1a) + f(¸¡1b)] = ¸f(¸¡1a) +
¸f(¸¡1b) = ¯ f(a) + ¯ f(b). Consider a 2 L and ¹ 2 <. As A is radial, there exists ¸ > 0
such that ¸¡1a;¸¡1¹a 2 A. Therefore, ¯ f(¹a) = ¸f(¸¡1¹a) = ¸¹f(¸¡1a) = ¹ ¯ f(a). It is
straightforward to check that ¯ f is the unique linear extension of f. ¯ f is continuous as f is
continuous at 0. Thus, f has a unique extension ¯ f 2 L, or equivalently, f = ¯ fA. We now
verify hypotheses (1) and (2).
(1) e is continuous ([10], XII.2.4). (c) implies that Oi is closed in M. Therefore,
OA
i = \a2Ae¡1(:;a)(Oi) is closed in MA. Consider a point of accumulation of Ti, say g.
As g is also a point of accumulation of OA
i , we have g 2 OA
i . It remains to show that
g = ® + ¯ fA for some ® 2 M and ¯ f 2 L.
(b) and (c) imply that MA is metrized by d+(f;g) = supfkf(a)¡g(a)k j a 2 Ag ([10],
XII.8.2). Consequently, there exists a sequence (gn) ½ Ti converging to g in the d+ metric,
and therefore also converging pointwise. Each gn is of the form gn = ®n + fn, where
®n 2 M and fn 2 L(A). As A is a barrel, 0 2 A. Deﬁne ® = g(0) and f = g ¡ ®. As g is
continuous, so is f. As (gn) converges to g, limn"1 k®n ¡®k = limn"1 kgn(0)¡g(0)k = 0.
For every a 2 A, we have
kfn(a) ¡ f(a)k = kgn(a) ¡ ®n ¡ g(a) + ®k · kgn(a) ¡ g(a)k + k®n ¡ ®k
It follows that limn"1 kfn(a) ¡ f(a)k = 0. Consider a;b 2 A and ¸;¹ 2 < such that
¸a + ¹b 2 A. As each fn is linear and M is a topological vector space, we have
f(¸a + ¹b) = lim
n"1
fn(¸a + ¹b) = ¸ lim
n"1
fn(a) + ¹ lim
n"1
fn(b) = ¸f(a) + ¹f(b)
Thus, f is linear on A. By (0), f = ¯ fA for some ¯ f 2 L. Consequently, g = ® + ¯ fA 2 Ti.
(2) We now show that Ti is equicontinuous on A. Let Br = fx 2 M j kxk < rg.
As Oi is compact, it is bounded. Assume, without loss of generality, that Oi ½ B1. If
L2 = ff 2 L j f(A) ½ B2g is equicontinuous on L, then f® + f j ® 2 M ^ f 2 L2g is
equicontinuous on L, and therefore, on A. It follows that f® + fA j ® 2 M ^ f 2 L2g is
equicontinuous on A. If Ti ½ f®+fA j ® 2 M ^ f 2 L2g, then Ti is equicontinuous on A.
31We ﬁrst show that Ti ½ f® + fA j ® 2 M ^ f 2 L2g. Consider g = ® + f 2 Ti.
Then, ® = g(0) 2 Oi ½ B1 and f 2 L(A). For every a 2 A, kf(a)k = kg(a) ¡ ®k ·
kg(a)k + k®k < 2, i.e., f(A) ½ B2. By (0), there exists ¯ f 2 L, such that ¯ fA = f. Thus,
g = ® + ¯ fA. As ¯ f(A) = f(A) ½ B2, we have ¯ f 2 L2.
Finally, we show that L2 is equicontinuous. It suﬃces to show that L2 is bounded
for the topology of pointwise convergence ([28], III.4.2). Consider L with the topology
of pointwise convergence. We need to show that, for every open neighborhood U ½ L of
0 2 L, there exists ¸ 2 < such that L2 ½ ¸U. It suﬃces to show this for every U ½ L that
belongs to a local base at 0 2 L.
Given a 2 L and E ½ M, let (a;E) = fh 2 L j h(a) 2 Eg. A set U belonging
to a local base for the topology of pointwise convergence on L at 0 2 L is of the form
U = \k
j=1(aj;E) for some fa1;:::;akg ½ L and some open neighborhood E of 0 2 M. For
¸ 2 < ¡ f0g, ¸U = ¸ \k
j=1 (aj;E) = \k
j=1¸(aj;E).
As A is a barrel, ¹j = supf¹ 2 (0;1] j ¹aj 2 Ag exists. Let º > 0 be such that
B2 ½ ºE. Let h 2 L2. Then, h(A) ½ B2 ½ ºE. Thus, h(¹jaj) 2 ºE, i.e., h(aj) 2 ¸jEj
where ¸j = º=¹j. Therefore, h 2 (aj;¸jE). Setting ¸ = maxf¸j j j = 1;:::;kg, we have
h 2 \k
j=1(aj;¸E) = \k
j=1¸(aj;E) = ¸U. Thus, L2 ½ ¸U.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.2. If the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.4 are satisﬁed, then the
result follows from Theorems 2.3.5 and 2.4.5. (a), (b) and (d) imply that Assumptions (a),
(b) and (c) of Lemma 2.3.4 are satisﬁed. By (1.4.1), ui(t;a;b) = v¤
i ±ti(b) = v¤
i ±e(¼i(t);b).
¼i is continuous as it is the projection mapping. e is continuous as A is compact ([10],
XII.2.4). Thus, ui is continuous, and consequently, Caratheodory. (d) and (e) combine




(a) (X;T ) is a topological space, Y ½ X, and TY is the subspace topology on Y ,
(b) B(X) (resp. B(Y )) is the ¾-algebra generated on X (resp. Y ) by T (resp. TY ).
Then, B(Y ) = fE \ Y j E 2 B(X)g.
Proof. Let F 2 TY . Then, there exists E 2 T such that F = E \ Y . As E 2 T , we
have E 2 B(X). Consequently, TY ½ fE \ Y j E 2 B(X)g. As fE \ Y j E 2 B(X)g is a
¾-algebra, it follows that B(Y ) ½ fE \ Y j E 2 B(X)g.
32Conversely, let C = fA [ (B ¡ Y ) j A 2 B(Y ) ^ B 2 B(X)g. We show below that
B(Y ) = fE\Y j E 2 Cg. Therefore, we need to show that fE\Y j E 2 B(X)g ½ fE\Y j
E 2 Cg. For this, it is suﬃcient to show that B(X) ½ C. It is easy to show that C is a
¾-algebra on X. Moreover, suppose E 2 T . Then, E \ Y 2 TY ½ B(Y ) and E 2 B(X). It
follows that E = (E \ Y ) [ (E ¡ Y ) 2 C. Therefore, T ½ C. It follows that B(X) ½ C.
To complete the argument, we show that B(Y ) = fE \ Y j E 2 Cg. If F 2 B(Y ),
then F ½ Y and F = F [ ; = F [ (; ¡ Y ) 2 C. Consequently, B(Y ) ½ fE \ Y j E 2 Cg.
Conversely, let A 2 B(Y ) and B 2 B(X). Then, [A[(B¡Y )]\Y = (A\Y )[[(B¡Y )\Y ] =
A \ Y = A 2 B(Y ). Therefore, fE \ Y j E 2 Cg ½ B(Y ).
Lemma B.2. Suppose
(a) fXi j i 2 Ig is a countable family of separable metric spaces,
(b) for every i 2 I, Xi is given the Borel ¾-algebra B(Xi), and
(c) X =
Q
i2I Xi is given the product topology and the Borel ¾-algebra B(X).
Then, B(X) is identical to the product ¾-algebra generated on X by the family of ¾-algebras
fB(Xi) j i 2 Ig.
Proof. See Theorem I.1.10 in [26].
Lemma B.3. Given the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.4,
(A) Ui(t;:;:), Ui(t;a;:) and Ui(t;:;b) are continuous for every t 2 T, a 2 A and b 2 Ai,
(B) Ui(:;a;b) : T ! < is measurable for every (a;b) 2 A £ Ai, and
(C) Ui(:;:;b) : T £ A ! < is measurable for every b 2 Ai.
Proof. (A) and (B) follow immediately from the assumptions. (C) follows from (A), (B)
and Theorem 6.1 in [15].
Lemma B.4. Given the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.4, Fi(t;:) is lower hemicontinuous for
every t 2 T.
Proof. Fix t 2 T. Lemma B.3(A) implies GrFi(t;:) = f(a;b) 2 A £ Ai j b 2 Fi(t;a)g =
f(a;b) 2 A £ Ai j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g is open in A £ Ai. Let E be open in Ai. Note that
Fi(t;:)¡(E) = fa 2 A j Fi(t;a) \ E 6= ;g
= ¼1 (f(a;b) 2 A £ Ai j b 2 Fi(t;a)g \ A £ E)
= ¼1(GrFi(t;:) \ A £ E)
where ¼1 : A £ Ai ! A is the projection ¼1(a;b) = a. As GrFi(t;:) and A £ E are open
in A £ Ai, GrFi(t;:) \ A £ E is open in A £ Ai. As ¼1 is an open mapping, Fi(t;:)¡(E)
is open in A.
33Lemma B.5. Given the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.4,
(A) Fi is weakly measurable,
(B) Fi(t;a) is convex and open in Ai for every (t;a) 2 T £ A, and
(C) IntFi(t;a) 6= ; for every (t;a) 2 Di.
Proof. (A) By deﬁnition, for every E ½ Ai, we have
F
¡




f(t;a) 2 T £ A j b 2 Fi(t;a)g =
[
b2E
f(t;a) 2 T £ A j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g
As Ai is compact metric, it is separable. Let C be a countable set that is dense in Ai and






f(t;a) 2 T £ A j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g
By Lemma B.3(C), f(t;a) 2 T £ A j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g 2 T £ B(A) for every b 2 E \ C. As
E \ C is countable, F
¡
i (E) 2 T £ B(A).
(B) follows from Assumption (d) and Lemma B.3(A).
(C) follows from (B) and the deﬁnition of Di.
Lemma B.6. Given the assumptions of Lemma 2.3.4,
(A) Di 2 T £ B(A),
(B) Dt
i is open in A for every t 2 T, and
(C) Da
i 2 T for every a 2 A.
Proof. (A) Lemma B.5 implies Di = F
¡
i (Ai) 2 T £ B(A).
(B) Fix t 2 T. Then, Dt
i = fa 2 A j Fi(t;a) 6= ;g = [b2Aifa 2 A j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g.
Lemma B.3(A) implies fa 2 A j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g is open in A for every b 2 Ai.
(C) Fix a 2 A. Lemma B.3(A) implies that
Da
i = ft 2 T j Fi(t;a) 6= ;g =
[
b2Ai
ft 2 T j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g =
[
b2C
ft 2 T j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g
Lemma B.3(B) implies ft 2 T j Ui(t;a;b) > 0g 2 T for every b 2 C. As C is countable,
Da
i 2 T .
34Notes
1. By “economic” we mean a theory based on rational choice, as opposed to one that
seeks other explanations, e.g., evolutionary theories.
2. A related question is: given an organization design, what features of the environ-
ment will rationalize that design? Answers to this question, say in the case of the ﬁrm,
may be found in the literature following [1], [2], [8], [16], [20], [23] and [30]. If observed
designs are interpreted as optimal responses to their environments, then a solution of the
general normative problem also contains the answer to the above question.
3. As shown in [24], using an argument combining the “revelation principle” with an
“obedience principle”, this set-up of the problem is canonical, i.e., a large class of seemingly
diﬀerent principal-agent problems can be re-cast in this set-up without any substantive loss
of generality.
4. The general model is more complicated in that the principal oﬀers a mechanism
in the ﬁrst stage, which speciﬁes message spaces for the principal and the agent and an
outcome function that maps message proﬁles to outcomes. By the revelation principle,
the mechanism oﬀered can be restricted to be a direct mechanism that induces truthful
revelation of types in equilibrium. This, along with the fact that the agent has no pri-
vate information, implies that the types-to-outcome mapping resulting from the truthful
implementation of the mechanism coincides with the outcome function itself, as stated
above.
5. We simply assume the existence of a regular conditional distribution. However,
existence of such a function is guaranteed if Ω and T are separable standard measurable
spaces ([26], V.8.1).
6. This requirement can be dropped if the relevant linear spaces are ﬁnite dimensional.
7. Examples of barreled spaces include every l.c.s. that is a Baire space, in particular
Banach spaces and Fr´ echet spaces ([28], II.7.1). See [28] for other terminology used in the
proof of this result.
35References
[1] Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs and economic
organization. American Economic Review 62, 777-795.
[2] Arrow, K. J. 1974. The Limits of Organization. W. W. Norton.
[3] Aubin, J-P. and H. Frankowska. 1990. Set-valued Analysis. Birkh¨ auser.
[4] Berge, C. 1963. Topological Spaces. Macmillan.
[5] Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston. 1986. Common agency. Econometrica 54, 923-942.
[6] Browder, F. E. 1968. The ﬁxed point theory of multi-valued mappings in topological
vector spaces. Mathematische Annalen 177, 283-301.
[7] Cho, I. K. and D. Kreps. 1987. Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102, 179-221.
[8] Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the ﬁrm. Economica 4, 386-405.
[9] Dixit, A., G. M. Grossman and E. Helpman. 1997. Common agency and coordination:
general theory and application to government policy making. Journal of Political
Economy 105, 752-769.
[10] Dugundji, J. 1989. Topology. Wm. C. Brown.
[11] Dunford, N. and J. T. Schwartz. 1988. Linear Operators, Part I: General Theory,
Wiley Interscience.
[12] Fan, K. 1952. Fixed-point and minimax theorems in locally convex topological linear
spaces. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38, 121-126.
[13] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press.
[14] Grossman, S. and O. Hart. 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem.
Econometrica 51, 7-46.
[15] Himmelberg, C. J. 1975. Measurable relations. Fundamenta Mathematicae 87, 53-72.
[16] Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340.
[17] Kim, T., K. Prikry and N. C. Yannelis. 1987. Caratheodory-type selections and
random ﬁxed point theorems. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 122,
393-407.
[18] Laﬀont, J.-J. and J. Tirole. 1986. Using cost observation to regulate ﬁrms. Journal
of Political Economy 94, 614-641.
[19] Lazear, E. and S. Rosen. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts.
Journal of Political Economy 89, 841-864.
[20] Marschak, J. and R. Radner. 1972. The Theory of Teams. Yale University Press.
36[21] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole. 1990. The principal-agent relationship with an informed
principal: the case of private values. Econometrica 58, 379-409.
[22] Maskin, E. and J. Tirole. 1992. The principal-agent relationship with an informed
principal, II: common values. Econometrica 60, 1-42.
[23] Mirrlees, J. 1976. The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an
organization. Bell Journal of Economics 7, 105-131.
[24] Myerson, R. B. 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent
problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 67-81.
[25] Myerson, R. B. 1983. Mechanism design by an informed principal. Econometrica 51,
1767-1798.
[26] Parthasarathy, K. R. 1967. Probability Measures on Metric Spaces. Academic Press.
[27] Rao, M. M. 1987. Measure Theory and Integration. John Wiley & Sons.
[28] Schaefer, H. H. 1986. Topological Vector Spaces. Springer-Verlag.
[29] Shavell, S. 1979. Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship.
Bell Journal of Economics 10, 55-73.
[30] Williamson, O. E. 1967. Hierarchical control and optimum ﬁrm size. Journal of
Political Economy 75, 123-138.
[31] Wilson, R. 1968. The theory of syndicates. Econometrica 36, 119-132.
37